Abstract. Certificate-based authentication of parties provides a powerful means for verifying claimed identities, since communicating partners do not have to exchange secrets in advance for authentication. This is especially valuable for roaming scenarios in mobile communications. When dealing with certificates, one must cope with the verification of complete certificate paths for security reasons. In mobile communications, there exist special conditions for this verification work. Mobile devices may have limited capacity for computation and mobile communication links may have limited bandwidth. In this paper, we propose to apply PKI servers -such as implemented at FhG-SIT-that allow the delegation of certificate path validation in order to speed up verification. Furthermore, we propose a special structure for PKI components and specific cooperation models that force certificate paths to be short. Additionally, we deal with the problem of users who do not have Internet access during the authentication phase. We explain how we have solved this problem and show a gap in existing standards.
Introduction
With the ongoing development in the area of mobile communication technologies we are approaching the next generation mobile Internet step by step. However, there are several security problems, e.g., confidentiality, access control, and entity authentication, attributed to roaming users. Certificate-based authentication provides a powerful means for communicating parties to verify claimed identities without the necessity of distributing shared secrets beforehand. Thus, certificate-based authentication is attractive to support roaming in mobile communications. Furthermore, the concept of digital signatures, that requires the application of certificates, allows the introduction of complex business models.
Strong authentication is useful for purposes of authorization and accounting. During public key based authentication protocols several cryptographic computations must be performed by both parties. However, in addition to the computations directly related to the protocol, the verifying parties must validate the certificate that belongs to the corresponding public key of the communication partner. We consider X.509v3 conformant certificates. In practice, the verifier must verify the correctness (i.e., verification of the certificate signature and validity time) and revocation status of not one certificate but rather every certificate in a certificate path. In order to construct and verify this path, the verifier fetches the certificates of the issuing CAs up to the trust anchor. In addition, up-to-date revocation information must be retrieved for every certificate. A trust anchor is a public key -with its associated certificate-that is trusted by the verifier. If the verifier trusts a CA's public key and the certificate then no further path construction and verification is necessary beyond this certificate. A party defines its own trust anchor set containing all of its trust anchors.
In this work, we propose to apply PKI servers for certificate-based authentication in order to make certificate path validation more efficient. At the Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Telecooperation, such a PKI server has been developed. The delegation of validation work to PKI servers reduces the time for path validation and retrieval costs. This is very valuable for mobile devices with restricted capacity and beneficial in low bandwidth mobile networks. Furthermore, we propose a specific structure regarding the location of PKI components and specific cooperation models that restrict the length of certificate paths to a small value. Short certificate paths reduce the time needed for certificate path verification. We describe our ideas for Internet Service Provider (ISP) roaming models that are supported by a Roaming Service Provider (RSP) that allows the efficient introduction of roaming agreements. The applicability is not restricted to this specific roaming model. It can also be applied to other mobile communication contexts, e.g., involvement of WLAN providers. Furthermore, we propose how PKI servers can support mobile users who do not have Internet access yet and need to validate an ISP certificate. Unfortunately, there is no standard available that solves this problem. We explain how we have solved this problem by using a new extension for TLS [4, 5] and modifying the semantics of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [13] . However, a standard is needed.
Requirements for Certificate-Based Authentication in Mobile Contexts
The verification of public key certificates can become very complex as already pointed out in [3] . Today's existing standard applications, e.g., web browsers, are still far from supporting the processing of arbitrary certificate paths. The situation becomes even more difficult when we focus on mobile communications. In the following, we state specific problems that do not exist in the non-mobile context.
Limited capacity.
Mobile devices may be limited in computational capacity. This means that not all devices can necessarily carry out heavy computational work within a reasonable period of time. Thus, the construction and verification of longer certificate paths is not possible for them. 2. Limited bandwidth. Potentially, mobile devices can only have network connections with rather small bandwidth. Thus, the amount of data to be transferred for certificate verification should be small.
3. Demanding processes. There are processes that have special requirements regarding the maximum time for the complete authentication process. One of these is handover. Before a handover is completed, the mobile node and the attendant must authenticate each other. Since the quality of the connection should not be affected too much by the handover, the time that is necessary for the verification of certificates should be as short as possible. 4. Verification without network access. When a mobile node establishes an Internet connection to an attendant without having an existing Internet connection to another attendant, the mobile node cannot carry out the work that is necessary to verify the attendant's certificate which is presented to him within the authentication protocol. In order to verify the certificate, the mobile node requires information to construct the certificate path and to check the status of the certificates. One cannot assume that the mobile node has this information locally available.
The idea of this work is to apply PKI servers (PKIS) that support the authenticating parties either by providing them with relevant information (e.g., certificate status information) or by offering them complete certificate verification services (e.g., path construction, verification of certificate correctness, status information evaluation). The services of a PKIS will be requested when carrying out the authentication protocol. When the mobile node does not have Internet access, it is possible that it asks the attendant to delegate some desired verification work to a selected PKIS on behalf of him. The same principle is already described in RFC 3546 [4] , where the intention is to ask the authenticating party from within a TLS handshake protocol to provide the verifier with an OCSP response covering its own certificate generated by a trusted responder [13] .
Framework for Mobile User Roaming
In this work, we assume that authentication of entities is based on appropriate protocols that apply public key cryptography with corresponding certificates which state that a public key really belongs to a given identity. The usage of public key cryptography for certificate-based authentication has many additional advantages compared to other approaches in which mutual secrets are shared. This has an impact on the set of business models, especially when considering directions for money flows in these models, that allow reasonably secure cooperation among the parties involved therein, as described in [15] . In general, the application of public key cryptography allows the introduction of stronger solutions for authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) so that the trust requirements are easier to fulfil in potential business models in mobile communications.
Parties in ISP Roaming Models
In order to present our solutions to apply certificate-based entity authentication in the context of mobile communication and to support mobile user roaming, we restrict our considerations to those users that roam to different ISPs. Even if we restrict the focus of our considerations to roaming users that use Internet access services from distinct ISPs, this does not affect the generality of our solution's underlying principles. These principles also hold in other roaming scenarios that deal with certificate-based entity authentication. We assume that a user has some specific relationship with one ISP that offers Internet access at which the mobile user has subscribed for ISP services. After service provision, contacted ISPs are recompensated by the subscribed ISP.
Usually, an ISP has an interest in allowing its customers to roam to many other ISPs, since a more extensive mobile network increases the attractiveness of its services. Since the number of ISPs is expected to increase, bilateral roaming agreements cause a considerable workload for ISPs. We use a specialized party, called Roaming Service Provider (RSP) that supports ISPs in roaming contexts. The RSP acts as an intermediary for ISPs by reducing the effort for an ISP to establish roaming agreements with other ISPs. However, it is not our intention to present the complete functionality of an RSP. Instead, we will restrict our considerations exclusively to those aspects that are related to PKI.
Location of PKI-Related Components
In order to support certificate-based entity authentication in mobile communications, we propose a special structure for the location of specific PKI components. This structure guarantees that the length of certificate paths that have to be processed for entity authentication is upper-bounded by a small value. In the following, we will explain which PKI-related functions are associated to which entities.
In our proposal, an RSP operates a certification authority CA (R) , which issues certificates. This is depicted in Figure 1 . The colors and arrows in this figure show the association of certificates and issuing CAs. Furthermore, the RSP operates a component CRI (R) that provides certificate revocation information, e.g., as certificate revocation lists (CRL) or as certificate status information via OCSP [9, 13] . Additionally, an RSP has a PKI server PKIS (R) to which certificate path validation work can be delegated by other parties, e.g., in accordance with SCVP which is currently being standardized [12] . There are different types of ISPs. Large ISPs, e.g., ISP 1 in Figure 1 , may operate their own certification authority CA (I) , CRI (I) for the provision of revocation information for certificates issued by CA (I) , and their own server PKIS (I) . Smaller ISPs, e.g., ISP 2 in Figure 1 , may use the PKI services of another party, e.g., the RSP. CA (I) of ISP 1 can either be certified by an additional third party or have a self-signed certificate ( Figure 1 shows the self-signed case). Furthermore, ISP 1 also has an additional cross-certificate issued by CA (R) . CA (I) issues certificates for ISP 1 's customers. When a contractual relationship to a customer is canceled before the expiration date of the customer's certificate, or if the certificate should be invalidated, then CA (I) revokes the certificate, i.e., this is reflected in the revocation information of CRI (I) . From a PKI-related point of view, ISP 2 only plays the role of a registration authority. When a customer registers with ISP 2 , then ISP 2 checks the customer data and provides the customer with a certificate generated by CA (R) . Consequently, when the customer certificate has been revoked, CRI
(R) provides the corresponding information.
ISPs are potentially interested that their competitors cannot access the complete revocation information on all their customers, e.g., in order to hide customer fluctuation from competitors. If this kind of secrecy is required then access to a corresponding CRI component is exclusive to specific parties.
PKISs also have own public keys and certificates which they obtain form their associated CAs. These keys are applied by parties that have delegated validation work to a PKIS in order to verify the integrity of responses given by a PKIS.
RSP Cooperation
In practice, there may be several RSPs, each holding business relationships with many ISPs. In order to allow customers to roam to ISPs that are not associated with the RSP of customer's home ISP, it is necessary to introduce special cooperations among RSPs. We say that all ISPs and their customers that belong to the same RSP span an RSP domain.
We propose three variants for RSP cooperation to support roaming of mobile users to ISPs whereas mobile users and ISPs belong to distinct RSP domains for given RSP 1 , . . . ,RSP n , with n > 1. T (e) denotes the trust anchor set of entity e, and c(e) denotes its certificate. Furthermore, we assume that c(CA
if e belongs to the domain of RSP i , e.g., e is a mobile user, an ISP, or an RSP i that operates a PKIS (R) i . Trust anchor sets are applied for the construction of certificate paths, i.e., in our proposal, they are applied by PKISs. In general, trust anchor sets to be applied can be specific for the party that delegates certificate path construction to a PKIS has several certificates, i.e., a public key certificate (potentially selfsigned), and cross-certificates issued by CA has no permission to access revocation information for the corresponding certificate, but PKIS (R) l has the required permission, e.g., since it belongs to the same RSP domain as the certificate holder. The party that initiates re-delegation has to be provided with the address of the party to which the work is re-delegated. In order to solve this problem we propose a special X.503v3 certificate extension PKISRedelegationExt according to the rules for certificate extensions in [9] .
In practice, RSPs can choose whether they establish their cooperation based on cross-certification, on the appropriate definition of trust anchor sets, or on re-delegation. All these variants are based on a direct cooperation of RSPs. Note that certificate path verification across distinct RSP domains would also be possible without the direct cooperation of RSPs, e.g., by cross-certification chains of arbitrary length. However, the verification of such certificate paths can become very time-consuming, and thus, we do not recommend it.
Authentication of Mobile Users
In this section, we show how PKISs can be applied to support contacted ISPs that authenticate mobile users. We consider mechanisms for certificate path verification of user certificates during the authentication protocol.
When a mobile user sends his certificate to a contacted ISP within an authentication protocol, then the contacted ISP delegates the verification of the complete path, including the mobile user's certificate, to a specific PKIS. This PKIS is operated by the RSP of his own domain. This is depicted in Figure 2 . The work to be done by a PKIS differs depending on whether the mobile user and the contacted ISP belong to the same or distinct RSP domains. When the certificate path has been verified by the PKIS, it sends a delegation response to the contacted ISP. According to the content of this message, the mobile user can be authenticated or not, i.e., if the result of the delegation is negative, the claimed identity should not be accepted by the contacted ISP even if further verification results in the authentication protocol are positive. The usage of a PKIS for certificate path verification in mobile user authentication has several advantages for contacted ISPs:
-Delegation to PKISs, or re-delegation, respectively, can be useful when only specific parties have the right to access components that provide certificate revocation information. Potentially, there are CAs that do not allow certificate revocation information retrieval by all ISPs. -PKISs can cache certificates of CAs which may be contained in certificate paths. Since the core work of a PKIS requires that the PKIS has CA certificates available, the probability is rather high that cached certificates can be used several times. Thus, caching speeds up the verification process. -PKISs can cache revocation information. Thus, a PKIS can use cached revocation information within certain periods, e.g., some hours. If cached revocation information can be used for several verification delegation requests, then there is a speed up in verification time.
When the contacted ISP sends a delegation request for certificate path verification to the PKIS provided by the RSP in his own domain, the PKIS processes this request as shown in Figure 3 . In the first step, the PKIS decides if redelegation is required. Note that re-delegation may only occur when the mobile user and the contacted ISP belong to distinct RSP domains. In our work, we assume that for each delegation request by ISPs only one re-delegation is allowed, in order to avoid re-delegation chains -this reduces time for path verification. If the PKIS opts for re-delegation, then it sends the request for verification re-delegation to a PKIS of the mobile user's RSP domain. For this case, the mobile user's certificate contains an X.509v3 extension PKISRedelegationExt that refers to the correct PKIS address. Upon receipt of the re-delegation request the contacted PKIS starts the same algorithm as depicted in Figure 3 without option for further re-delegation. The PKIS that has initiated re-delegation then waits for the re-delegation response. Upon receipt of this response, the PKIS evaluates it and creates a delegation response for the requesting ISP. In case a PKIS does not re-delegate the verification request, it carries out the complete work for certificate path construction and verification. The PKIS fetches the issuer certificates for the presently considered certificate in the path until the issuing CA is contained in the trust anchor set or the maximum acceptable path length is reached. The PKIS may obtain the CA certificates directly from the CA or from its local database. When the complete certificate path has been constructed in this way, then the PKIS starts to check the correctness of the certificates by applying the corresponding public keys. If all certificates in the chain are correct, then the PKIS checks the revocation status of these certificates by exploiting the information that is provided by corresponding CRI components. Depending on the result of the verification the PKIS creates a delegation response and sends it to the requesting ISP.
The effort that is necessary by a PKIS for the construction of certificate paths, the verification of its correctness, and the status checks depends on several factors: Do the mobile user and the ISP belong to the same or distinct RSP domains? Is the mobile user's certificate issued by his subscribed ISP's CA service or by an RSP CA? What is the type of cooperation among RSPs?
In the following we consider the certificate paths that have to be verified for a certificate of a mobile user U . We denote the certificate of party X by c(X). The arrows '→' indicate the order a PKIS constructs a path. Note that the PKIS has the certificate and the public key of the applied trust anchor stored locally. We assume that verifying PKISs apply their own trust anchor set. 1 For the trust anchor's certificate no revocation check is done. Certificates, that require a revocation check, are marked by '↓'. Revocation information for a certificate is provided by the CRI component of the CA that follows next in the path. A PKIS has to fetch those certificates that are contained after the first and before the last certificate in the chains shown below. There are the following certificate paths:
U and contacted ISP in RSP i domain, U has obtained c(U ) from CA (I)
operated by his subscribed ISP:
i , RSP cooperation based on cross-certification:
4. U in RSP i domain, contacted ISP in RSP j domain, U has obtained c(U ) from CA (I) operated by his subscribed ISP, RSP cooperation based on crosscertification:
i , RSP cooperation based on the modification of T :
from CA (I) operated by his subscribed ISP, RSP cooperation based on the modification of T :
i , RSP cooperation based on re-delegation to PKIS
from CA (I) operated by his subscribed ISP, RSP cooperation based on re-
As can be seen above, certificate paths are shorter when ISPs do not provide their own CA service. When RSP cooperation is based on the appropriate definition of trust anchor sets or re-delegation, the effort for verification is reduced compared to cross-certification. The biggest effort is required in case 4. However, even there the effort for certificate path verification involves only fetching two certificates (c(CA (I 
Authentication of ISPs
In this section, we focus on the opposite direction of mutual authentication: mobile users authenticate contacted ISPs. In order to do this, we propose that PKISs support mobile users in certificate path verification of ISP certificates.
Besides the advantages of PKIS-based certificate path verification mentioned in the previous section, there are some additional reasons that make the usage of PKISs attractive:
-Limited bandwidth of mobile connections. The construction of certificate paths may require the collection of certificates from several CAs until a trust anchor is reached. Furthermore, revocation status information has to be collected for these certificates. -Limited capacity of mobile devices. The verification of certificate correctness requires extensive computational work for all certificates in the path. -Support of mobile users that do not have Internet access at the authentication phase. (Note that they connect to an ISP to obtain Internet access. However, this aspect is not relevant for mobile users that authenticate ISPs when their Internet connection is handed over from one ISP to another ISP, i.e., they can use their existing connection for certificate path verification, e.g., in case of a soft handover.)
Referring to the last reason, there are different solutions of how to deal with this problem. As a first possibility, the mobile user could carry out the authentication protocol without having the result of certificate path verification and certificate status information. Then, he could use the Internet connection -obtained from the not completely authenticated ISP-to validate the ISP's certificate. If the verification yields that the certificate path is not valid, then the mobile user can decide to terminate the connection. However, this solution is rather cumbersome. As a second possibility, the mobile user asks the contacted ISP within the authentication protocol to provide him with some desired verification results regarding the validity of his own certificate. This is sketched in Figure 4 . In order to achieve a high level of security, the verification result should include the verification of the complete certificate path for some given set of trust anchors. Therefore, the mobile user sends a validation request for the ISP's certificate to the ISP itself. This validation request contains a unique reference to the component that should carry out the validation of this certificate. This component is selected by the mobile user and it is trusted by the mobile user to carry out validation correctly. In our scenario, this component is a PKIS that is provided by the RSP the mobile user is associated with. When the contacted ISP has received the validation request from the mobile user, it sends a message for verification delegation to the PKIS that is stipulated by the mobile user. When the PKIS has received the verification delegation message from the contacted ISP, it behaves in essentially the same way as described in the previous section. Either, it carries out the verification work on its own, or re-delegates it to the PKIS that is operated by the RSP that the contacted ISP is associated with; Figure 3 provides a rather abstract sketch for the sequence of steps that are carried out by the PKIS. Re-delegation requires an adequate X.509v3 extension PKISRedelegationExt in the ISP certificate. When the re-delegating PKIS obtains the re-delegation response, it has to evaluate it and create a new delegation response that is signed with its own secret key; such a delegation response is also created in the non-delegation case. Then, the delegation response is sent to the ISP who sends it in the validation response to the mobile user. The mobile user evaluates the validation response by checking the integrity of the validation response and applies its result in the authentication protocol. There are several reasons why the mobile user specifies which PKIS should carry out the verification. First, it can be assumed that the mobile user trusts this RSP. Second, it can be assumed that the mobile user has the public key of this RSP stored on his mobile device. This public key is necessary for the mobile user in order to be able to check the integrity of the validation response. It cannot be assumed that the mobile user has trustworthy public keys of arbitrary PKISs. Thus, a PKIS that initiated a re-delegation creates a new message when it has received the verificaton result from the PKIS to which verification was re-delegated.
The PKIS carrying out the verification work -either the PKIS that is contacted by an ISP, or the PKIS to which verification was re-delegated-follows the steps as sketched in Figure 4 operated by its own:
j , RSP cooperation based on cross-certification:
operated by its own, RSP cooperation based on crosscertification:
j , RSP cooperation based on the modification of T :
from CA (I) operated by its own, RSP cooperation based on the modification of T :
from CA (I) operated by its own, RSP cooperation based on re-delegation to
The properties of these variants for certificate path validation are the same as those in the previous section. The biggest certificate path length occurs in case 4, where the cooperation is based on cross-certificaton. The other cooperation models have the same lenghts as in the single domain case.
PKIS Technology
In the previous sections, we have explained why and how PKISs should be applied for certificate path validation in mutual authentication scenarios, especially in mobile communications. We have developed a PKIS, e.g., as described in [10] , that can be used in mobile communication scenarios. Due to space limitations, we cannot describe details of our PKIS solution. Currently, our PKIS is based on DPV technology [14] , i.e., in our implementation this technology is applied for the validation delegation and the delegation response. The adaptation of our PKIS to the current status of SCVP technology [12] is on its way. SCVP is currently being developed and standardized by the PKIX group. SCVP is a protocol that may be used for the implementation of the validation delegation and delegation response.
The PKIS supports several approaches on how to deal with certificate revocation information: CRLs and OCSP [9, 13] . Which technology is used in a specific instance depends on the way how CAs provide their revocation information, i.e., how they operate their CRI component. Thus, our PKIS supports both technologies.
So far, the PKIS is based on existing or presently emerging standards. For one aspect of our solution, there is no standardized solution in sight. When the mobile user authenticates the contacted ISP, there is the problem that the mobile user does not necessarily have Internet access at this stage. Thus, the validation of the ISP's certificate was delegated via the ISP to a PKIS which is trusted by the mobile user. In the current version of the TLS protocol and its newly standardized extensions [5, 4] , there is an option to ask for the status of a certificate with the extension CertificateStatusRequest. TLS can be used in mobile contexts over EAP (EAP TLS [1] ). The newly defined TLS extension allows the mobile user to request an OCSP response on the ISP's certificate to be generated by a trusted OCSP responder. The standardization of this extension was motivated to support constrained clients to check the validity of certificates by using a certificate-status protocol such as OCSP. This avoids the transmission of CRLs, and therefore saves bandwidth in networks with limited capacity. However, an OCSP response only provides information about the status of the certificate contained in the request. Note that an OCSP response says nothing about the validity of a certificate path for a certificate with respect to a given trust anchor. In OCSP, there are three indicators for the status value of a certificate: good, revoked, and unknown.
In order to obtain information about the validity of a complete certificate path, a TLS extension that allows the initiation of a complete certificate path validation for some given certificate and a given trust anchor set would be more appropriate. Therefore, an extension that invites a contacted ISP to send a SCVP request to a PKIS instead of an OCSP request to an OCSP responder is necessary. However, such a standard does not yet exist. In order to circumvent this existing gap, our solution tackles this problem by using the existing TLS extension. We cope with the problem by using OCSP with modified semantics. The PKIS generates an OCSP response good in order to indicate that the certifi-cate path is valid. An OCSP response revoked is produced in case of an invalid path, and unknown is used in case no path could be built. With the validation delegation request, the contacted ISP asks the PKIS for an OCSP response with appropriately modified semantics. When the contacted ISP receives the OCSP response, he sends it to the mobile user who interprets the modified semantics in the required way. This solution can be applied as long as there is no TLS extension to initiate a complete certificate path validation request. However, once SCVP is standardized, standardization work should be done to extend the current TLS extension to include support for SCVP requests.
Related Work
Certificate-based authentication and related problems have already been discussed in other work. In [7, 8] , the authors propose a solution on how to achieve a minimized handover delay. The proposed solution assumes an indirect trust generation. This means that in order to reduce the time for re-authentication in case of a handover the old domain controller provides the newly contacted domain controller with the mobile user identity. However, it is questionable whether the real trust relationships among domain controllers are always adequate for this solution. Furthermore, the approach focuses mainly on speeding up re-authentication in case of handover. No solution is given for speeding up authentication in general, e.g., by limiting certificate paths or by PKISs.
Typical problems that arise in the context of certificate path validation and the advantages of PKISs have been presented in [3, 10] . However, they do not address the benefits of PKISs in mobile communications. The authors of [11] considered the application of PKI servers for restricted mobile devices, but only for application contexts (e.g., m-commerce) and not for roaming scenarios.
In the SHAMAN project, certificate-based authentication for roaming devices in Personal Area Networks (i.e., spheres of about 10 meters radius) has been considered, e.g., see [6, 16] . There, the new concept of a personal CA has been introduced which differs from a usual large CA. All certificates in such PANs are issued by the same CA, whose public key is shared by all entities. Thus, there is no necessity for complicated certificate path validation. However, this model seems not to be applicable in general roaming scenarios.
Even if we have motivated the use of PKISs for certificate-based authentication in the case of ISP roaming, our ideas can be applied for other roaming contexts. According to [2] , for today's 4G visions there is a need for integrated certificate-based authentication at network access and service levels. The underlying principles of our solution are general enough that they can be applied to tackle the problems that arise in the context of certificate-based authentication for future mobile networks and their services.
Conclusion
The goal of this work was to provide solutions for the validation of certificate paths for certificate-based authentication in mobile communication scenarios. We have given proposals on where to locate PKI components, especially PKI servers that allow to speed up authentication of mobile users and contacted ISPs in case of roaming users. We have shown how to apply PKI servers in different roaming cooperations. Furthermore, we deal with the problem of mobile users that do not have Internet access, and thus cannot verify certificate paths on their own. We also showed a gap in existing standards for authentication and explained how we solved this problem until an appropriate standard is available.
